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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
prevents the domiciliary state from taxing the full value of the
vehicles."4
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota," the first case decided
by the Supreme Court involving state taxation of flight equipment,
airplanes flying on fixed routes through eight states were held taxable
for their entire value by Minnesota inasmuch as that state was the
domicile of the owner and it was not shown that the planes had ac-
quired a taxable situs in any other state; on the contrary, they were
only shown to have acquired a taxable situs within the taxing domi-
ciliary state. The principal case, the second decision concerning state
taxation of planes, involves the taxation of that proportion of air-
craft acquiring a tax situs within a taxing non-domiciliary state. The
power of a state to levy such an apportioned ad valorem tax on an
instrumentality of commerce, other than airplanes, was previously
held valid with2" and without reference17 to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The holding in the principal case that
eighteen stops per day in Nebraska were sufficient contact for the
planes to acquire a tax situs within that state is a reasonable appli-
cation of the previous cases."8 The benefits and opportunities of an
interstate air carrier doing business within, and operating through,
a state are no less than those afforded to interstate land and water
carriers.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UsE TAX-JURISDICTION TO REQUIRE OUT-OF-
STATE VENDOR TO COLLECT USE TAX
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)
Maryland's use tax statute requires the vendor, whether he is lo-
cated in or out of state, to collect and remit to the State of Maryland
the use tax on all goods sold to Maryland residents for use in Mary-
land.1 Miller Brothers Company, a Delaware corporation, sold goods
to Maryland residents only at its store in Delaware. Some of the
goods were carried home by the purchasers; others were delivered in
Maryland by Miller Brothers' trucks. This was Miller Brothers' only
14. Nor can a non-domiciliary state tax the full value of vehicles merely be-
cause they have a tax situs within that state. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
15. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
16. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
17. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
18. The doctrine of Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra note 13, would probably
prevent the domiciliary state from levying a tax on the entire value of flight equip-
ment engaged in interstate commerce even though the aircraft have a ta, situs
within the domiciliary state if the aircraft are shown to have acquired a tax
situs in other states.
1. MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws art. 81, §§ 368 to 396 (1951). See especially§§ 368(b), 368(k), 369 and 371. Of course, if the state sales tax has been paid,
the use tax need not also be paid. Id. § 370(a).
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contact with purchasers in the State of Maryland. When Miller Broth-
ers failed to collect the use tax, Maryland attached one of the company
trucks to satisfy a claim for use taxes on all sales by the company to
the residents of Maryland. The United States Supreme Court, four
justices dissenting, held that Maryland had no jurisdictional base by
which to make Miller Brothers its tax collector; therefore, the attach-
ment to satisfy the tax was a violation of due process.2
The Supreme Court has defined the applicability of the use tax
rather precisely. Its constitutionality was first upheld in 1937 in
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. Two years later, in Felt and Tarrant
Mfg. Co. ,. Gallagher,4 a state was allowed to impose on an out-of-
state vendor the duty of collecting a use tax for the state. In Nelson
v. Sears, Roebtik & Co.,6 the Supreme Court ruled that a mail order
company was bound to collect Iowa's use tax on mail order purchases
by Iowa residents from mail order houses located outside Iowa. The
company also had houses doing business in Iowa. The Court rea-
soned that since Iowa had extended to the company the privilege of
doing business in Iowa, it could require the company to collect the
use tax on all sales to Iowa residents. The Court said the fact that
Iowa could not enforce collection if the company were not qualified
to do business in Iowa would merely be the result of "impotence of
state power"" (rather than the lack of a constitutional right to im-
pose the duty). The next significant case was General Trading Co.
v. State Tax Commission,7 decided in 1944. A Minnesota corporation
had not qualified to do business in Iowa, and had no office there; it
hired traveling salesmen as agents to solicit orders in Iowa and send
them to Minnesota for acceptance. The Court held that Iowa could
compel General Trading Company to collect the tax as a retailer
having a place of business in the state.
2. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 (1954). The Maryland Court of
Appeals had held the company liable for the tax. Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md.
535, 95 A.2d 286 (1953).
3. 300 U.S. 577 (1937). The Constitutional objections were that the tax was
upon the operations of interstate commerce, and also that it discriminated against
interstate commerce. The court held that it was not a tax upon commerce but
upon the privilege of use after commerce was at an end, and that it did not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce because taxation fell equally on goods
purchased in or out of state.
4. 306 U.S. 62 (1939). In that case the vendor, an Illinois corporation which
had not qualified to do business in California and had no offices there, received
orders through soliciting agents, traveling salesmen, for acceptance in Illinois.
The company did, however, pay the rent of the salesmen's offices. The Supreme
Court affirmed California's determination that the Illinois corporation was doing
"a retail business in the state" and was therefore bound by the statute to collect
the use tax.
5. 312 U.S. 359 (1941). See also the companion case, Nelson v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
6. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1941).
7. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
8. The Court said the Felt and Tarrant case, supra note 4, was indistinguish-
able, despite the fact that the company in Felt and Tarrant paid the salesmen's
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss4/5
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In view of this line of decisions the instant case seems difficult to
support. The general issue here, as in the other cases, was whether
there was a jurisdictional base by which Maryland could make Miller
Brothers its agent to collect the use tax9 The specific issue in this
case depended on whether the continual physical presence of Miller
Brothers' trucks in Maryland provided such a jurisdictional base.
From a factual analysis, the continued presence within the state of
company trucks which were needed in order to consummate a large
number of the sales made to Maryland residents appears to be at
least as sufficient a base as the presence of the soliciting agents in the
General Trading Co. case.'0 Also, in the principal case as in the Sears,
Roebuck & Co. case, there were physical instrumentalities of the com-
pany within the state through which the state had the ability to com-
pel collection of the tax.l1 Underlying the whole problem is the
growing need for revenue with which to operate a modern state gov-
ernment. This factor indicates the merit of court cooperation with
state efforts to enforce tax laws.'2
office rent; the court also said the fact that the company in the Sears, Roebuck
& Co., case, supra note 5, had retail outlets in the state was not constitutionally
material. On the same day the court decided McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S.
327 (1944). In that case a Tennessee corporation was doing business in Arkansas
by a method substantially identical to that in the General Trading Co. case. The
Court held that Arkansas could not force the Tennessee corporation to collect
the Arkansas sales tax on sales which agents solicited in Arkansas. These two
cases establish the proposition that the same transaction may give rise to a
collector's liability for a use tax but not for a sales tax.
9. Justice Jackson appears to be incorrect in saying that the issue is the
same, practically and legally, as if the statute imposed the payment of a sales
tax on the Delaware company. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344(1954). His reasoning was that there would be no use tax without a Delaware
sale; therefore, to make Miller Brothers collect a use tax is to make it pay a
sales tax on a Delaware sale. In this statement, Mr. Justice Jackson seems to be
in error in three respects. First, the Court has consistently drawn a distinction
between use and sales taxes; see General Trading Co. v. Srate Tax Commission
and MeLeod . Dilweh~ Co., supra note 8. Second, although there can be no
use tax without a Delaware sale, there also can be no use tax unless the goods
are imported and used in the taxing state. Thus, although the sale does make
possible the collection of the use tax, the tax still is in no way a tax on the sale.The third point can best be understood in the light of Justice Jackson's dissent
in the General T'ading Co. case. In that case he said a state has no con-
stitutional right to make a tax collector of one whom it has no right to tax. 322
U.S. 335, 339 (1944). This same idea is found, though not explicitly, in the in-
stant case. This overlooks the fact that there may be a different jurisdictional
base for making one a tax collecting agent than for making him a taxpayer.
10. Justice Jackson's attempt to distinguish the General Trading Co. case
is far from convincing. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 346 (1964).
His treatment of the General Trading Co. case can best be understood by the
fact that he dissented in that case. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission,
322 U.S. 335, 339 (1944). See note 8 supra.
11. It is to be remembered that the significance of Sears being qualified for
business in Iowa was that it gave Iowa the ability to compel payment of the tax
which they could constitutionally require. See text supported by note 6 supra.
12. This is the theme of the dissent. Also, the particular facts in the principal
case vividly illustrate the need of a state to be able to enforce its use tax. Mary-
land occupies an unusual geographical position. It is a very small state sur-
rounded by the District of Columbia, Virginia, Delaware and Pennsylvania. A
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The instant case, however, may not foreclose a state's ability to
compel collection by an out-of-state vendor who delivers goods within
the state. Maryland's assessment of taxes against Miller Brothers
included taxes on sales where the customer brought the goods back
himself., The trial court held Maryland had no jurisdiction to com-
pel the vendor to collect the tax on such purchases, though it did
have jurisdiction to compel collection on goods which the vendor de-
livered. 1 The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, upheld the entire
assessment.'- The assessment on the goods which the purchaser
brought back himself appears to have been given significance in the
United States Supreme Court decision.', On argument Justices Jack-
son and Frankfurter asked a number of questions about the assess-
ment on those sales."' This point might help to explain why Justice
Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion in the General Trading Co. case,
apparently changed his position in the instant case and joined in the
majority opinion written by Justice Jackson, who had dissented in
the General Trading Co. case. If Maryland had presented to the Su-
preme Court the clean-cut issue of the tax collection only on the goods
delivered by the vendor,"' the persuasive dissent might well have been
very substantial portion of Maryland's population lives in south-central Mary-
land, adjacent to Washington, D.C., and naturally tends to shop in Washington.
The eastern portion of the state is isolated from Baltimore, the only large city
in the state, by Chesapeake Bay, and the people in that part of the state have
gone to Wilmington, Delaware and Philadelphia to shop.
In 1947 Maryland passed a sales and use tax. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art.
81,§§ 320 to 396 (1951). In 1947, however, none of the areas adjacent to Mary-
land had either sales or use taxes; Maryland's sales tax was thus an added in-
centive for Maryland residents to shop in the adjacent areas. The loss of potential
revenue to Maryland occasioned by its citizens shopping in other states totaled
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Source of information: Letter dated October 21,
1954, from Edward F. Engelbert, Assistant Director of Retail Sales Tax Division,
Comptroller of the Treasury, State of Maryland. Unless the state could
enforce collection of the use tax on out-of-state purchases, many citizens would
enjoy the benefits of living in the state without paying taxes to provide for them;
this would magnify an already heavy financial burden on the state. The Comp-
troller's office of Marvland instituted the action against Miller Brothers in the
principal case to test the validity and enforceability of the use tax as applied to
outstate vendors who would not cooperate in collecting the tax.
13. Brief for Appellant, p. 5, Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954).
14. Id. at 7, 8.
15. 1d. at 10. Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286 1953).
16. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 341, 344 (1954). Counsel for
Miller Brothers considered this point to be very helpful to them in obtaining a
reversal of the state court decision. Source of information: Letter dated October
25, 1954, from William L. Marbury, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland, Coun-
sel for Appellant, Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
17. Source of information: Letter dated October 21 1954, from Edward F.
Engelbert, Assistant Director of Retail Sales Tax Division, Comptroller of the
Treasury, State of Maryland.
18. The issues could have been separated at several points. First, the Comp-
troller could merely have made the assessment on those sales which the vendor
delivered. Second, the attorney for the state could have brought his action merely
for the tax on those sales. Third, the state court of appeals could have held the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss4/5
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the majority opinion in the case. Thus, if the issue is in the future
presented squarely to the Court, the principal case would be distin-
guishable, and the use tax may be upheld; however, it will be quite
difficult to obtain such a holding in the face of the principal decision.
WILLS--GENERAL PECUNIARY LEGACIES--VALUATION WHEN IN
TERMS OF FOREIGN MONETARY UNITS
In re Wirth's Estate, 132 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Surr. Ct. 1954)
A testator living in New York bequeathed 5000 gold marks to a
former servant, a resident of Germany. At the time the will was
executed the gold mark was not a unit of currency, but was a term
denoting a certain amount of gold having a definite value recognized
in the financial world. After the will was executed, but prior to the
testator's death, Germany went off the gold standard with the result
that the term "gold mark" had no monetary significance at the time of
probate. In proceedings to compel payment of the legacy, the court
held that the amount bequeathed should be measured by the value of
the gold mark on the date the will was executed.'
The amount of a general pecuniary legacy 2 is ordinarily measured
by the value of the monetary unit at the time payment is due,3 and is
payable in the current legal tender of the country where the will was
executed. An annuity of £80 bequeathed by a will made in England,
for example, was held payable in English and not in Irish pounds even
though the testator's estate was located in Ireland.4 If the legatee is a
resident of a country other than the one in which the will is executed,
however, payment is made in the legal tender of such other country,
according to the current rate of exchange.5 Accordingly, a legatee
domiciled in England and entitled to the sum of 30,000 rupees by the
terms of a will executed in India was held entitled to that amount of
English currency which would purchase 30,000 rupees in India on the
date the legacy was payable.
vendor liable only for the tax on goods delivered. Fourth, counsel for the state
could have stressed the difference between the two taxes before the Supreme
Court in order to save part of the assessment.
1. In re Wirth's Estate, 132 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Surr. Ct. 1954). The action was
instituted by the Attorney General of the United States who, as successor to the
Alien Property Custodian, vested the interest of the German legatee in the estate.
2. A "general pecuniary legacy" may be defined as a legacy of a specified sum
of money without a designation of the fund from which it should be paid. 4
PAGE, WILLS § 1393 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
3. In re Manus' Estate, 200 Misc. 441, 106 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Surr. Ct. 1951); 4
PAGE, WILLS § 1587 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
4. Wallis v. Brightwell, 2 P. Wins. 88, 24 Eng. Rep. 652 (1722); accord,
Pierson v. Garnet, 2 Bro. C.C. 38, 29 Eng. Rep. 20 (1786).
5. In re Manus' Estate, 200 Misc. 441, 106 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
6. Cockerell v. Barber, 16 Ves. Jr. 461, 33 Eng. Rep. 1059 (1810).
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